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Abstract
Laws that work well in developed market economies may produce unexpected out-
comes in a corrupt environment. The paper argues that the Russian legal system is
impaired by the capture of regional arbitration courts and analyzes the consequences
of this capture for functioning of bankruptcy institution in the late 1990s. A model of
strategic interaction among main stakeholders generates the following results. First,
governors and managers of large regional enterprises colluded to use bankruptcy proce-
dure as a mechanism of expropriation of the federal government’s revenues and claims
of outside investors. Second, the bankruptcy law did not put pressure on managers to
restructure; instead, the law could have prevented restructuring even when managers
wanted to do so. Empirical analysis substantiates the theoretical findings and shows
that regional political factors were important in explaining implementation of the 1998
Russia’s bankruptcy law.
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1 Introduction
Institutions that perfectly fit a well developed market economy may bring disastrous out-
comes when transplanted to an economy on the way to market: many laws that work well
in a country with the rule of law produce bad outcomes in a corrupt environment. This
paper studies the eﬀect of a particular legal transplant - Russia’s bankruptcy law of 1998 -
that was drafted to satisfy up-to-date academic standards but initiated a wave of ineﬃcient
property redistributions controlled by Russian regional political powers.1
Ideally, a bankruptcy law should protect creditors, impose financial discipline on man-
agers, induce restructuring, and free assets from ineﬃcient use.2 The Russian bankruptcy
law of 1998 was expected to accomplish these goals. Since it was relatively harsh on the
incumbent management, the law was supposed to improve managerial incentives.3 At the
same time, it included provisions aimed at avoiding ineﬃcient liquidations: judges overseeing
the proceedings were given discretion to refuse liquidations suggested by creditors. Prior to
1998 most Russian firms accumulated large arrears to the government and private creditors.
Thus, experts had predicted that the law would have caused a flood of bankruptcies.4 The
number of bankruptcies has, indeed, increased dramatically since the law was adopted (see
the first column of Table 1). Many economists interpreted this fact as evidence of hardening
of managerial budget constraints. Aggregate figures on initiation of bankruptcies turned out
to be misleading, however: Majority of existing companies have not started to restructure
1Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard (2003) provide a cross-country study the eﬀects of legal transplantation.
2Hart (2001) and Georgakopoulos (2001) provide a general framework for discussion of an ideal bankruptcy
procedure. A well-functioning bankruptcy law has been considered an important component of transition
from planned to market economies by the literature. Aghion, Hart, and Moore (1992) studied the challenges
of designing bankruptcy rules in transition economies. In particular, they suggested some measures to
overcome liquidity constraints of potential buyers in liquidation. Berkovitch and Israel (2001) and Claessens
and Klapper (2001) studied bankruptcy procedures around the world.
3According to the 1998 Russia’s bankruptcy law, reorganization procedure (called “external manage-
ment procedure”) implied replacement of incumbent management team by external manager nominated by
creditors’ meeting and appointed by the judge.
4In 1997, the share of loss-making enterprises in Russia was about 50 percent, total overdue loans and
taxes amounted to 30 percent of GDP, of which overdue tax liabilities to consolidated budget were about
7% of GDP (Goskomstat, 1999).
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and bankruptcies were initiated primarily against ‘nonexistent’ firms that disappeared right
after registration; many of these firms were created with the sole purpose of tax evasion.5
This paper provides a simple theoretical model of subversion of bankruptcy institu-
tion and analysis of firm-level data to show that in contrast to expectations the Russian
bankruptcy law of 1998 softened managerial budget constraints. Enactment of the law re-
sulted in abuse of judges’ discretionary powers by regional authorities. Governors’ control
of regional judiciary allowed them to stop liquidation of politically powerful but ineﬃcient
enterprises and extract political rents from the managers. Using bankruptcy procedure, gov-
ernors also often protected local enterprises from paying taxes to the federal center. Thus,
instead of removing bad management, closing down loss-making enterprises, and protecting
creditor rights as intended, the bankruptcy institution became a major tool of conservation
of the ineﬃcient status-quo.
The model investigates how bankruptcy capture aﬀects managerial incentives, the finan-
cial position of firms, and protection of creditor rights. A firm with a manager and two
creditors is considered. One of the creditors is a regional governor, who can influence de-
cisions of bankruptcy judges. The firm is insolvent in terms of verifiable cash flows, but
has high private benefits that accrue to the manager. The model demonstrates that if the
judge is under the governor’s influence and the manager and the governor can collude, debts
are not repaid, the firm does not restructure, and the manager pays bribes to the governor
in exchange for protection from losing control during bankruptcy. As a result, the outside
creditor’s claim is expropriated by the coalition of the incumbent manager and the governor.
The model shows that the Russian bankruptcy law not only failed to create additional
incentives for restructuring, but the law may have even prevented it when managers were
interested in pursuing restructuring. Indeed, in the model when oﬃcial regional taxes are
small, the governor wants to prevent restructuring because he can extract bribes only from
the insolvent firm. If the governor values oﬃcial taxes highly, restructuring may not happen
since the governor cannot commit to liquidate, in case no restructuring occurs, because he
5In 2000, after the full recovery from 1998 crisis, the share of loss-making enterprises in Russia remained
above 37 percent; yet, bankruptcy has been initiated against no more than 2 percent of these firms (Goskom-
stat, 2001). Second column of Table 1 shows the numbers of bankruptcies initiated against present (existent)
debtors.
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may still prefer to accept a bribe from the manager. The model provides a classic example
of state capture: the manager may capture the bankruptcy procedure via the governor when
the governor values bribes, regional taxes are small, and controlling the judge is not very
costly for the governor.6
In the late 1990s in Russia, the federal government was in the position of any outside
creditor vis-a`-vis regional governors and managers of regional enterprises since it could not
collect tax arrears that constituted the most sizable claim on firms.7 The mechanism of
asset expropriation from the federal government and outside investors was based on three
components: First, the 1998 law gave large discretionary power to arbitration judges in
decisions about appointments of arbitration (temporary, liquidation, and external) managers.
For our analysis, it is important that the judge could overrule the creditors’ nomination
of a candidacy for the external manager. Second, these arbitration judges tended to be
controlled by regional governors. There is a voluminous anecdotal evidence suggesting that
the decisions of the judges in the regional arbitration courts were often politically captured
by the regional governments. According to the Russian legislation, all arbitration courts
are in the federal jurisdiction and, thus, supposedly independent of the regional governors.
The practice diverged from the law. Lack of federal financing of arbitration courts and the
large political and geographical distance from the federal center for many jurisdictions made
arbitration courts highly dependent on regional politics. Media reports many examples of
direct financing of courts by regional administrations.8 And third, reorganization procedure
6For discussions of state capture see Bardhan and Mookherjee (2002), Hellman, Jones, and Kaufman
(2000), and Slinko, Yakovlev, and Zhuravskaya (2003).
7The federal government with its claim for tax arrears was by far the largest outside creditor because
private outside lenders were reluctant to finance firms due to the absence of functioning bankruptcy law
before 1998.
8The best known examples of dependence of arbitration judges on regional political elite were the
bankruptcy proceedings of the oil holding Sidanko and of its key subsidiaries Chernogoneft and Kond-
petroleum in 1999. During the Chernogoneft bankruptcy proceedings, 98% of the creditors voted for a cer-
tain external manager, but the judge overruled their decision and appointed a diﬀerent candidate connected
to another oil company Tyumen Oil. The court also rejected the oﬀer by Chernogoneft to pay all creditors
in full. Incidentally, the Tyumenskaya Oblast governor, Leonid Roketsky, happened to be the Chairman of
the Tyumen Oil’s Board. Tyumen Oil bought Chernogoneft for $176 million and Kondpetroleum for $52
million (a small fraction of the actual value). Black, Kraakman, and Tarasova (2000) wrote: “apparently . . .
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with the incumbent management team reappointed as ”external management” was used by
the regional governors and managers to freeze claims of outsiders by means of exercising
control over judges.9
Application of the model to Russia’s bankruptcy institution allowed us to formulate pre-
dictions about, first, the ex ante regional-, industry-, and firm-level factors that influence
the probability of a particular firm falling into the external management and the liquidation
procedures after the enactment of the 1998 law (holding the level of firm’s financial health
constant), and second, the extend of ex post restructuring after the initiation of external
management procedure against firms. Our empirical analysis supports the theoretical predic-
tions. Ceteris paribus, the external management procedures were more frequently initiated
against firms in the regions with politically strong governors that could more easily control
courts, in the regions with higher independence of the governor from the federal center that
made it less politically costly to expropriate the federal tax revenues, and in regions with
nontransparent tax collection system that made administering bribes easier. Profitability of
the industry (our proxy for the size of private benefits) made the external management more
likely and liquidation less likely. In addition, we found no evidence that the initiation of ex-
ternal management procedure increased restructuring eﬀorts within firms. These findings are
consistent with the bankruptcy capture model and seem to contradict the view that Russia’s
bankruptcy institution was politically independent rather than regionally subverted.
The paper contributes to the literature on the new comparative economics (for a survey,
see Djankov et al. 2003) by analyzing the consequences of a legal transplantation and to the
literature on Russia’s federalism (de Figueredo and Weingast, 2001, Shleifer and Treisman,
2000, Sonin, 2003, Treisman, 1997, Zhuravskaya, 2000, Ericson, 2000, and Ponomareva and
Zhuravskaya, 2002) by documenting that the bankruptcy institution is used as a mechanism
Tyumen Oil didn’t merely bribe judges (Sidanko could have oﬀered its own bribes), but threatened them
as well. . . ” The Economist (Dec. 4, 1999) said that “according to allegations of Tyumen Oil’s rival the
company intimidated judges; in addition, Sidanko complained that: If they just stuck to bribing judges, we
could play that game too.”
9The name for a reorganization procedure in Russian law was ironic: the ”external management” proce-
dure often did not result in a management change. A more appropriate name for the procedure would have
been ”incumbent management” procedure.
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for redistribution of revenue from the federal center to the regions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly presents stylized facts
about bankruptcy in Russia. Section 3 contains theoretical analysis. Section 4 describes the
results of testing the implications of the theoretical model. Section 5 concludes.
2 Bankruptcy in Russia
Russia has had a bankruptcy law since November 1992.10 The 1992 law was completely
ineﬀective. Between 1992 and 1998, very few companies went bankrupt. A common view is
that the failure of this law to bring about financial discipline was due to the limited scope
of its application and excessively complicated procedures. For initiation of a bankruptcy
procedure, the total amount of outstanding debt had to exceed the total book value of
company’s assets. To avoid bankruptcy, a company manager could simply issue worthless
debt to his own firm at a high face value. Ineﬀectiveness of the 1992 law motivated the
adoption of another law in March 1998 that is a focus of our study.
The law of 1998 was drafted according to Western standards and made the initiation of
bankruptcy very easy. Formally under the 1998 law, if a creditor filed a bankruptcy petition,
the following procedure was undertaken. First, a temporary manager, appointed by an
arbitration court judge, collected information about the claims on the company and organized
a creditors meeting. At the meeting, the creditors decided if they wanted liquidation or
reorganization. Second, the judge, taking into consideration the resolution of the creditors
meeting, made a ruling on the liquidation or reorganization of the company and appointed
liquidation manager if liquidation was ordered or external manager if reorganization was
ordered. The judge did not necessarily need to follow the creditor’s request. This clause
in the law was motivated by the fact that creditors may opt for an ineﬃcient liquidation.
Initiation of both procedures deprived the incumbent management of control over the firm
unless a member of the incumbent management team was appointed as the external manager.
In December 2002, a new bankruptcy law was adopted.11 The changes made in the new law
10Although the first Russia’s bankruptcy regulation was adopted in 1740, there has been no bankruptcy
institution during the five decades of the soviet regime preceding 1992.
11For an overview of main changes made, see Branch, Goncharova, and Sonin (2003).
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aimed at reducing outright fraud that was frequent when the 1998 law was in force; most
features of 1998 law important for our story remained intact in the new reduction.
A look at bankruptcy statistics allows noting some interesting features of the implementa-
tion of the 1998 law. Right after the enactment, liquidation procedures were initiated solely
in small and medium-size enterprises. In contrast, external management procedures were
primarily initiated in very large enterprises. On average, output of firms with external man-
agement was fifteen times as large as output of firms that entered liquidation procedures and
the diﬀerence in the number of employees was fourfold.12 The political economy literature
supplied convincing arguments explaining why politicians may be opposed to liquidation of
large companies and why there can be too few liquidation procedures.13
An interesting fact is that the bankruptcy procedures initiated right after the enactment
of the 1998 law were unevenly distributed across industries. Externally managed firms were
more than proportionally represented in oil and gas, chemicals, and ferrous and nonferrous
metallurgy by far the best performing industries in Russia at that time (there were no liqui-
dation procedures in these industries at all). In contrast, liquidations were most frequently
initiated against firms in construction-oriented industries (logging, wood-working, and con-
struction materials) that were the worst performing before the devaluation that followed the
August 1998 crisis. At the same time, some quite poorly performing industries like many
branches of light industry were completely unaﬀected by either procedure.
In addition there is a lot of anecdotal evidence that external management procedures
were particularly frequent among the large and politically important firms in politically and
economically strong regions whereas many poorly-performing regions were unaﬀected by
bankruptcy procedures.14
These last two pieces of evidence create a puzzle of why, on the one hand, poor perfor-
mance was not associated with larger risk of bankruptcy and, on the other hand, reorgani-
zation procedures were frequently ordered in seemingly financially sound firms in relatively
12The source of statistical facts in this sub-section is the authors’ data; their description and formal
analysis follow in the empirical section of the paper.
13See, for instance, Shleifer and Vishny (1994). A thorough study of political economy of transition is
Roland (2000).
14Sidanko in Tumenskaya oblast again is an example.
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successful industries and regions. Our model of regional political protection provides an
explanation for this puzzle.
3 Theory
The Setup
Consider a firm with an outstanding overdue debt. There are three agents: a manager who
is currently in control, and two creditors: an outside investor, and a governor. The outside
investor is the major creditor: the firm has a large amount of outstanding debt to him. The
governor also has a claim on the firm in terms of overdue regional taxes τ (that may include
social contributions and debts to the regionally owned enterprises).
In addition to tax income (repayment of regional tax arrears and flows of future taxes),
the governor also values side payments (bribes). In exchange for bribes, he may use his
influence on bankruptcy procedures to protect an insolvent firm from other creditors.
The firm is currently insolvent in terms of verifiable cash flows and generates zero ver-
ifiable profits. Thus, the creditors cannot be paid oﬀ. The firm could pull out of financial
distress by deep restructuring. Restructuring requires high managerial eﬀort, and substan-
tial time. We assume that after restructuring the firm repays all its debts, and operates
profitably thereafter. A key assumption is that although the firm is insolvent, there is a sig-
nificant private benefit that accrues to the manager in control. This private benefit includes
hidden income, on-the-job benefits, and so on.15
While the firm is insolvent, creditors can file a bankruptcy petition with an arbitration
court. This initiates a procedure administered by a judge. The procedure is modeled in the
following way: (i) the judge decides whether to liquidate or reject the request for liquidation,
and (ii) in the case of liquidation, the judge administers it. If the request for bankruptcy is
rejected, the ineﬃcient status-quo is maintained: the manager remains in control and runs
the firm as he chooses.
In reality, the judge does not need to reject the petition: he may simply appoint a manager
chosen by the old manager or even re-appoint the same manager as external manager to
15One possibility is that the manager diverts profits from the profitable firm and fakes insolvency.
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implement the reorganization.16 One reason for doing this is that the creditors may appeal
to a higher level court if the judge declines to initiate bankruptcy.17 In contrast, if the judge
initiates external management and does not change the management team, under the law all
debts become frozen for the period of the external management procedure, creditors cannot
file a petition with another court, and the status quo is preserved. In order to link the model
with our empirical analysis (below), one needs to keep in mind that ”rejection” in our model
corresponds to the external management procedure. Explicitly allowing for reorganization
with an external manager appointed by the judge yields the same qualitative results as the
simplified setting presented here.18
The judge may be either independent (benevolent) or corrupt. When the judge is benevo-
lent his decisions are fully determined by the procedure. The outside investor as the majority
creditor is given the right to make the decision about the fate of the firm. In liquidation,
the judge maximizes proceeds from the sale of assets, and distributes them according to the
priority rule: debts to the local budget τ are paid first, while the outside creditor gets L− τ ,
where L is the liquidation value (L ≥ τ). A benevolent judge might turn down the majority
creditor’s request for liquidation when it is socially eﬃcient to do so.
When the judge is corrupt, his decisions are captured by the governor. If the governor
prefers liquidation, the judge rules accordingly and gives all of the liquidation value to the
governor. This is not an important assumption. It can be interpreted as capture of the
liquidation procedure: the judge (on the behalf of the governor) manipulates the liquidation
auction to facilitate plain robbery of the firm’s assets. If the governor prefers continuation,
the bankruptcy request is rejected. Influencing the judge is associated with a fixed cost γ
for the governor (the cost of influencing the judge is prohibitive for the outside investor).
The interaction is repeated infinitely. In each period, the timing of the relationship is as
follows. First, the manager undertakes an action. Thereafter, the creditors decide whether
to file a bankruptcy petition or not. If one of them does, the judge decides whether to reject
the request or to liquidate. If the governor controls the judge, the governor and the manager
16The bankruptcy law formally requires that the manager be replaced. What we have in mind is that the
new manager essentially represents the same interests as the old one.
17They may also petition for an individual debt repayment.
18This is formally shown in an earlier draft of the paper. (see CEPR Discussion paper No. 2488).
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may collude: a bribe can be paid by the manager to the governor in exchange for protection
against liquidation.
The firm
The only input into the firm is managerial eﬀort. We denote managerial eﬀort by e ∈ {C,R}
where C stands for continue without restructuring (low eﬀort) and R stands for restructure
(high eﬀort).19 This eﬀort is observable, but not verifiable (and, thus, not contractible).
If the manager chooses e = C, he secures that the firm is not run down while remaining
insolvent. When the manager undertakes eﬀort e = R, we say that he starts restructuring.
To emphasize that this is a long process, we assume that the process can be interrupted.20
After restructuring has been initiated, but before it has been completed, the creditors may
file a bankruptcy petition. In such a case, restructuring can be completed only if the request
is turned down. When the firm is restructured (i.e., the manager chooses R and restructuring
is not interrupted by liquidation), it becomes solvent and can be run profitably from the
next period on.
The payoﬀs
There are private benefits that accrue to the player who has control over the firm. We
assume that the manager earns no private benefit in the first period if he starts restructuring;
the forgone private benefit represents the cost of exerting high eﬀort. We denote the life-
time benefit (discounted to the period 1) of the manager when he completes restructuring
and, thus, stays in control forever by V R. Similarly, let V C denote life-time manager’s
payoﬀ, when the manager exerts a low eﬀort (e = C) in all periods. Then, (1 − δ)V C is
the corresponding one period private benefit. We assume that V C > V R > 0, and so the
manager has no direct incentives to restructure.
In each period t, the manager pays a nonnegative bribe bt to the governor in exchange
for protection from liquidation: the threat of liquidation may come either from the outside
19An earlier draft of the paper (CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2488) shows that the same qualitative results
are obtained in the model that in addition to restructuring or continuation allows the manager to strip the
firm of all assets. This is an extreme case of tunnelling (Johnson et al., 2000).
20This assumption was first made by Roland and Verdier (1999).
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investor or from the governor. When the judge is independent, the governor has no protection
to oﬀer, and the bribe is equal to zero. If the judge is dependent and the firm is restructured
or liquidated in the first period, the bribe flow is BR = b1. The manager needs no more
protection after the first period since either the firm has become solvent in terms of verifiable
cash flow, or he is out of control. In contrast, if the manager never undertakes restructuring,
he pays the total of BC in discounted bribe flow, BC =
P∞
t=0 δ
tbt. Each period, bribe bt is
determined in negotiations (described in detail below).
To simplify the presentation of our infinitely repeated game, we use a short form for
the continuation game following the first sequence of moves.We write the manager’s payoﬀ :
UM = V
j −Bj, where V j and Bj are the life-time private benefit and the discounted bribe
flow, respectively; j ∈ {C,R}.
The governor’s payoﬀ is UG = GR+BR, if the firm is successfully restructured, UG = τ , if
the firm is liquidated under the outside creditor’s control, UG = L−γ if the firm is liquidated
under his own control, and UG = B
C − γ if the firm continues to be unrestructured.21 The
latter two payoﬀs include the (negative of) the cost of influencing the judge.
The outside investor’s payoﬀ is given UI = IR when the firm is restructured: debts are
repaid and a flow of interest on new loans (not explicitly modelled) accrues to the investor.
When the firm is liquidated by an independent judge, UI = L − τ . In all other cases the
outside investor earns zero payoﬀ.
The Independent Judge Case: A Benchmark
In this section, we consider the case when the judge is independent (formally, this corresponds
to the case of γ = ∞). All the results in this section are just a repetition of the findings
obtained elsewhere in the literature; the section, however, provides a useful benchmark.22
First, we note that the governor cannot aﬀect the outcome. The governor can trigger
bankruptcy, but the outside investor controls the procedure: he decides whether to liquidate
or not.23 As a result, the governor has no incentives to file a bankruptcy petition. We assume
21It is assumed that the firm continues to be unrestructured only if the governor uses the judge to protect
the firm from the outside creditor.
22Berkovitch and Israel (1999) and Hart (2000) oﬀer thorough surveys of the literature.
23Under the 1998 law, the government representatives could not vote at a creditors’ meetings. Since the
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that when a player is indiﬀerent between triggering bankruptcy or not, he chooses not to.
Thus, when the judge is independent, the governor has no role to play.
In the case of an independent judge, the sequence of moves in every stage game (which
takes one period) is as follows:
Step 0. The manager chooses eﬀort e ∈ {C,R} .
Step 1. The outside investor chooses whether or not to trigger bankruptcy and liquidate.
Step 2. If the manager is still in control, either restructuring is completed (if it started at
Step 0), or the firm remains insolvent (if e = C). If bankruptcy is triggered at Step 1, the
firm ceases to exist. All the players receive their payoﬀs.
After Step 2: If restructuring has been completed, the firm enters the phase where it
operates with profit. Old debts are repaid out of verifiable profit, and a flow of interest and
taxes is generated. If the manager had not initiated restructuring but was left in control,
the stage game starts over at Step 0 in the next period. In all other cases, the firm does not
exist any longer. The stage game is illustrated in Figure 1, where the payoﬀs are computed
for the corresponding continuation game.
We assume that restructuring is socially eﬃcient: formally, V R + IR + GR ≥ L. The
manager, however, prefers to run the firm with low eﬀort whenever V C > V R. The following
proposition shows the beneficial eﬀect of the threat of bankruptcy on managerial incentives.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the investor prefers restructuring, i.e. L− τ ≤ IR. Then the
threat of bankruptcy induces restructuring as long as V R ≥ (1− δ)V C .24
The condition is that the life time private benefit of restructuring for the manager, V R,
exceeds his one-period private benefit of simply running, (1− δ)V C. Under these conditions,
the bankruptcy law serves its purpose. The threat of losing control induces the manager
to restructure. The next proposition shows that a functioning bankruptcy law produces
ineﬃcient outcome when the creditor is more interested in receiving the liquidation value
than in continuation.
tax debt is a higher priority claim than the debt owed to the private creditors, private creditors are entitled
to decide on the fate of the firm.
24All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
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Proposition 2 If L− τ > IR, any subgame equilibrium yields the termination of the firm’s
activity: the manager exerts low eﬀort and the firm is liquidated.
The result of Proposition 2 reveals a pitfall of this simple procedure. It corresponds
to a classic ineﬃciency result applied to creditor-oriented procedures (see e.g., Hart, 2000).
An important assumption is that the manager cannot bribe the outside creditor to avoid
bankruptcy. A possible reason is that there are many outside investors who may not agree
on how to share the potential bribe revenue (Berglo¨f et al., 2002).
By assumption, restructuring is always eﬃcient. Thus, liquidation that occurs when
L−τ > IR is socially suboptimal. This justifies why society may not wish to let the creditor
alone decide on the fate of the insolvent firm; instead, it can delegate the decision-making
power to a judge. We next consider the case when the judge has discretion to reject a request
for liquidation. In accordance with the objective of the law to promote social eﬃciency, the
judge can decline the request of liquidation only when the manager has already started
restructuring. To illustrate the potential value of leaving some discretion to the judge, we
present the following result:
Proposition 3 In equilibrium of the game, in which the judge has discretion, the outcome
is eﬃcient if (i) V R ≥ (1− δ)V C , and (ii) the judge is benevolent.
The result in Proposition 3 depends crucially on the assumption that the judge acts in
the social interest. Indeed, since managerial eﬀort is not verifiable, compliance with the rule
heavily relies on the judge’s benevolence. In the Russia’s context, this assumption appears to
be particularly unreasonable. The next section considers the risks of corruption and collusion
associated with discretionary power given to an opportunistic (or dependent) judge.
Capture of Law
In this section, we investigate the situation where the governor can, at some fixed cost γ ≥ 0,
capture the judge’s decision in bankruptcy. When the governor exercises his influence, the
judge eﬀectively rubber-stamps the governor’s decisions. If bankruptcy is triggered, the
governor decides whether to liquidate or reject the request (we assume that rejection is
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equivalent to the external management procedure with the same manager). If he chooses to
liquidate, the governor appropriates all the liquidation proceeds as side income.
The dependent judge case is symmetric to the independent judge case in the following
respect. When the judge is independent, the governor has no real power because he cannot
vote at the creditors meeting. In a similar way, political capture deprives the outside investor
of influence over the procedure. She can trigger bankruptcy, but the governor can reject the
request. Moreover, if liquidation follows, the governor appropriates all the proceeds.
The new feature of the capture model is collusion: the governor and the manager can
agree on a deal where the governor uses his influence to protect the manager from liquidation
in exchange for a bribe. The collusive agreement arises as the outcome of negotiations. As
above, we ignore the passive player, here - the outside investor. The timing of the stage
game in each period is the following:
Step 0. The manager chooses an eﬀort e ∈ {C,R}.
Step 1. The governor and the manager bargain over a bribe. If agreement is reached,
the manager stays in control, and the game continues to the next period. If there is no
agreement, the governor files a bankruptcy petition and liquidates.
Step 2. If the manager is still in control, either restructuring is completed (if started at
Step 0), or the firm remains insolvent (if e = C). If liquidation procedure is triggered at Step
1, the firm ceases to exist. The players receive their payoﬀs from the firm and the bribe is
paid to the governor. If restructuring is completed, the firm enters a phase where it operates
with profit. Old debts are repaid out of verifiable profit, and a flow of interests and taxes is
generated. If the manager had not initiated restructuring but was left in control, the stage
game starts over at Step 0. In all other cases the firm exists no more.
The stage game is illustrated in Figure 2, where the payoﬀs are computed for the corre-
sponding continuation game.
Collusion
The outcome of negotiations about the size of the bribe subject to the manager’s liquidity
constraint at Step 1 is the collusive agreement. The manager pays the bribe out of his
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current private benefit.25 We do not explicitly model the bargaining game. Instead we use
the (constrained) symmetric Nash bargaining solution. Our main results do not depend on
the chosen solution concept. In particular, they hold, with some minor changes, for the
alternative procedures where either the manager or the governor makes a take-it-or-leave-it
oﬀer.
First, we assume that γ < L, so that the cost of influence is suﬃciently small for gover-
nor’s threat to intervene to be credible. Below, we also consider the case of L− γ ≤ 0.
Bargaining occurs after the manager has chosen his eﬀort. The collusive deal is about
giving a credible promise to protect from liquidation in the current period in exchange for
a bribe. In the subgame following e = R, the net gain from avoiding bankruptcy at Step 1
is V R + GR − (L− γ) . When restructuring has been initiated, postponing bankruptcy for
one period is equivalent to ’postponing’ it forever. In the next stage, the firm is solvent
and cannot be bankrupt any more. The main issue here is that the manager is liquidity
constrained. Under restructuring, the first period’s private benefit is equal to zero. The
manager cannot pay the governor, so the gains from collusion cannot be realized.
Now we turn to the case when the chosen eﬀort is low, e = C (collusion might appear
in this case only). Postponing liquidation for another period (till the next stage game is
played) would allow the manager to earn his one-period private benefit, (1− δ) δV C . Since
the governor can liquidate in the next period as well, the cost of postponing the liquidation
to him is (L− γ) (1− δ) . Thus, the net gain is
£
δV C − (L− γ)
¤
(1− δ) , which we assume
to be strictly positive.26 We denote the symmetric Nash bargaining solution by bN .
bN =
1
2
£
δV C + (L− γ)
¤
(1− δ) . (1)
Formally, bN = argmax
¡
δV C (1− δ)− b
¢
(b− (L− γ) (1− δ)) s.t. b ≥ (L− γ) (1− δ) (the
governor’s rationality constraint) and b ≤ (1− δ)V C (the manager’s liability constraint).
Note that the manager has zero outside option. If negotiation breaks down, liquidation
occurs (see proof of proposition 4). Thus, the manager’s next period payoﬀ will be zero.
In the current period he earns V C (1− δ) irrespective of whether he accepts or refuses to
25We assume that there is no outside enforcement of illicit contracts. Bribes are self-enforceable in the
model: paying the bribe is an equilibrium outcome of the repeated game.
26In the opposite case there is no gain from collusion.
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pay the bribe. Note that bN ≤ (1− δ)V C (since
£
δV C − (L− γ)
¤
(1− δ) > 0). Therefore,
the manager’s liquidity constraint is not binding. For the same reason, we also see that
BC = 1
2
£
δV C + L− γ
¤
> (L− γ) : the normalized net present value of the flow of bribes
satisfies the governor’s incentive constraint.
To complete the analysis, we have to investigate whether these collusive outcomes can
be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium of the whole repeated game. We do this in
the next section.
Equilibrium allocation under political capture
The central theoretical result of the paper is the following:
Proposition 4 When (i) δV C > L−γ and (ii) GR < L−γ, any subgame perfect equilibrium
entails no bankruptcy and no restructuring. Each period t, the manager pays a bribe b∗t to
the governor such that
BC∗ =
∞X
t=0
δtb∗t =
bN
1− δ ,
where bN is the bargaining solution described in (1).
The intuition for Proposition 4 is that the governor can only protect the manager in
exchange for bribes as long as the manager needs protection, i.e. the firm is insolvent.
Condition (i) secures that there is a positive gain of collusion, so the governor prefers to
extract bribes in each period rather than liquidate at Step 1 each period. Condition (ii)
states that when the manager initiates restructuring, the governor liquidates because he
values tax income too little relative to the outcome from (captured) liquidation. Therefore,
the manager never initiates restructuring.
The Proposition 4 is the most relevant to the Russian reality. It depicts a situation when
the governor and the manager explicitly collude against the outside investor. The result in
Proposition 4 covers situations where the manager’s per period private benefit is larger in
the insolvent firm than in the restructured one. One reason for why this may be the case is
that the absence of financial discipline makes it easier to hide income.
Proposition 4 remains true even for V R > V C . This is a remarkable result which empha-
sizes the potential costs of corruption in bankruptcy. In the capture model, the bankruptcy
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law may hinder restructuring. When V R > V C , the manager has private interest in re-
structuring. Restructuring does not happen in equilibrium because capture of bankruptcy
provides the governor with (additional) control rights over the firm. He uses these control
rights to protect his rents (flow of bribes). This requires keeping the firm insolvent.
Proposition 5 When (i) δV C > L− γ and (ii) V R < V C −BC∗, there is no restructuring
in equilibrium even for GR > L− γ.
Proposition 5 depicts a situation symmetric to that of Proposition 4. Here, the governor
values restructuring such that he would not liquidate if the manager initiated restructuring.
The manager, however, prefers to run and pay bribes for protection. Capture of bankruptcy
even in this case leads to no restructuring and no liquidation, since the governor cannot com-
mit to liquidate if he sees no restructuring (he prefers to take a bribe rather than liquidate).
Our last result shows that even when the threat of a governor’s intervention is not
credible i.e., L− γ < 0, capture of bankruptcy can be an important issue. Assume that the
outside investor is uncertain about the judge’s type (so he may file a bankruptcy petition in
hope that the judge is independent) while the manager knows that the judge is corrupt. We
have the following result:
Proposition 6 If γ < (1− δ)V C , a suﬃcient condition for the firm never to be restructured
is V R < δV C .
The intuition is that if γ < (1− δ)V C the manager can bribe the governor so that he
influences the judge who rejects the investor’s request for liquidation. Since the governor’s
threat to liquidate is not credible (L−γ < 0), the manager only needs protection against the
outside investor. The outside investor only files one time. The presumption being that once
she learns the true type of the judge, she leaves the manager alone.27 When V R < δV C , the
manager always prefers to pay all of his private benefit just once rather than restructure.
Note that this result obtains when L − γ < 0, i.e. when the governor has no additional
control rights (compared with the independent judge case). When L− γ > 0, we are in the
case depicted in proposition 4.
27This is consistent with the assumption that when a player is indiﬀerent between filing or not he chooses
not to file.
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Summing up, the model shows that when the judge is not independent from the governor,
there is a scope for collusion between the governor and the manager. The governor uses his
influence to secure that the manager stays in control. There are two reasons why there is
no restructuring. Either the manager prefers to run and pay bribes (prop. 5 and 6), or the
governor prefers to keep the firm insolvent to secure side income (prop. 4). The manager’s
and governor’s shares of the gains of collusion depend on the costs of influence and on the
liquidation value of the firm.
Allowing for collusion between the outside investor and the governor would not aﬀect
our results. Suppose that the outside investor oﬀers a bribe to the governor so that he (via
the judge) lets restructuring be completed. In this case, the governor would always take the
bribe but still initiate bankruptcy procedure to stop restructuring. Therefore, the outside
investor would never oﬀer such a bribe in the first place. In contrast, the manager only pays
the governor to avoid bankruptcy when the firm remains insolvent. The governor, then,
has no incentives to defect from the collusive agreement and bankrupt the firm because he
expects rents in the future. The results of the model, however, depend crucially on our
definition of bankruptcy capture in terms of (political) influence rather than bribes to the
judge. In particular, we rule out the possibility that the outside investor bribes the judge in
exchange for letting the manager complete restructuring.
4 Evidence
Data sources
We used data from the following sources: a list of publicly announced external managements
initiated in 1998 and the first half of 1999 comes from the Internet Securities and the
AK&M news data bases; a comprehensive list of liquidation procedures initiated in 1998 and
the first half of 1999 comes from the Higher Arbitration Court Journal (Vestnik Vysshego
Arbitrazhnogo Suda); statistical data for firms in 1996-1999 were obtained from the Russian
Enterprise Registry Longitudinal Database (RERLD);28 firm-level financial data come from
28This is an annual industrial censuses of large and medium-size industrial enterprises. Detailed informa-
tion on how the RERLD was constructed is given in Brown and Brown (1999).
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the ALBA data set of balance sheets for large Russian industrial firms; regional statistical
data come from statistical abstracts Regions of Russia, 1999, the oﬃcial web site of the
Russia’s State Tax Agency, and MFK Renaissance.
How do ex ante firm characteristics influence bankruptcy?
Available information on bankruptcies in Russia is very limited: we only have access to
the lists of firms against which bankruptcy procedures were initiated in 1998 and the first
half of 1999. We merge this information to firm-level, regional-level and industry-level data
from other sources. Unfortunately, there are no micro data on who initiated bankruptcy
procedures or what were the receipts of any of the claim holders. Therefore, it is important
to keep the data limitations in mind during the discussion of the testable predictions of our
model which follows.
Under the assumptions of symmetric information and no uncertainty, our model predicts
no bankruptcy in equilibrium because the outside creditor finds it not worth the eﬀort
to file a bankruptcy petition. With asymmetric information about the type of the judge,
bankruptcy can happen in equilibrium. Rejection of outside creditor’s request for liquidation
in our model corresponds to the initiation of the external management procedure with the
appointment of the same manager as an external manager. This consideration allows us to
formulate testable hypotheses. First, we focus on how the ex ante characteristics of firms,
their industries, and regions influence the odds that these firms would end up in either the
external management or liquidation procedure, or would not be aﬀected by either of the
procedures.
The model predicts that firms with high private benefits (holding other things constant)
are likely to be protected by regional governments. Since private benefits usually are in
industries with high cash flows and low in poorly-performing industries, we expect that in-
dustry performance increases the likelihood of external management procedure and decreases
the likelihood of liquidation. Political strength of the governor aﬀects costs of influencing
the judge, thus, regions with stronger governors should have fewer liquidation procedures
and larger number of external management procedures.
Anecdotal evidence that regional divisions of arbitration courts made rulings in favor
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of regional and against the federal authorities in bankruptcy hearings allow us to conclude
that the federal government often played the role of the largest outside creditor in firms
that accumulated sizable tax arrears. A testable hypothesis can be formulated about the
diﬀerences between regions with respect to the quality of their relationship with the federal
government. Politically hostile to the federal center regional government is more likely
to protect regional firms from paying federal taxes; thus, we expect external management
procedures to be more frequent and liquidation less frequent in the regions, where relations
between the governor and the federal center are hostile.
External management procedure in our model is accompanied by a stream of bribe pay-
ments from the manager to the governor. There are no direct measures of the level of bribes
in Russia’s regions. Nonetheless, in-kind tax payments and tax oﬀsets often provide an easy
quasi-legal channel for bribe payments from enterprises to regional authorities. Thus, we use
the percentage of regional taxes collected in kind as a proxy for bribes.29
In reality, monetary bribes are not the only means of payment for protection at managers’
disposal. Shleifer and Vishny (1994) stressed the importance of excessive employment as
means of pleasing politicians. Following the ”politicians and firms” story, we expect that
governors are more likely to protect firms with large employment.30
To test these predictions we estimate the Multinomial Logit regression model of a prob-
ability that a firm, given its characteristics before the 1998 law was adopted, (1) falls into
an external management procedure, (2) is liquidated, or (3) is unaﬀected by bankruptcy
during a year and a half after the introduction of the new law. We look at the ex ante char-
acteristics of firms in order to treat them as exogenous and rule out any reciprocal eﬀects
of bankruptcy onto firm characteristics. Our sample consists of 8,773 firms that are drawn
from the intersection of RERLD and ALBA data sets for 1997.
29A so-called governor’s oﬀ-budget fund, formed in 1997 in Kemerovskaya oblast, serves as example of
the well-established mechanism for illegal payments to the governor. According to Izvestia, a nation-wide
newspaper (16 September 1999), the deeply troubled West-Siberian Metallurgy Kombinat (ZapSib) has
regularly contributed to this fund while accumulating large federal tax arrears.
30Lizal (2002) shows some evidence that ”politicians and firms” story determined bankruptcy patterns in
the Czech Republic.
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We estimate the following model:
Pr {Yi = j}= F [β1R PolStri+β2R Hosti+β3R InKindi+β4I CashF i+β5Controlsi+εi]
i is an identifier of a firm in the sample. Y is an outcome after the introduction of the new
law: it is equal to one of the three following outcomes for each firm in 1998 and the first half
of 1999: 0 - bankruptcy procedure was not initiated, 1- external management procedure was
initiated, and 2- liquidation procedure was initiated. F is a logistic function. R PolStr is a
measure of political strength of the governor; it is an index constructed by MFK Renaissance
that measures the extend to which the regional governor had political control over the
regional economy in 1997 (larger values mean stronger governor).31 R Host is another MFK
Renaissance index that measures how hostile the relationships of the governor and the federal
government were in 1997 (larger values mean higher hostility).32 R InKind is our proxy for
percentage of in kind tax collections. It is equal to the negative of the log percentage of cash
regional tax collections in the total regional tax collections in 1997. I CashF is our proxy
for industry cash flows. It is equal to the negative of the five-digit-OKONH industry median
value of the logarithm of enterprises’ costs per unit of sales in 1997.33
The following variables are used as controls. First, we control for the firm-level charac-
teristics that influence the probability that firm ends up in bankruptcy: leverage ratio (log
debt to assets ratio), coeﬃcient of current liquidity (log ratio of liquid assets to short term
liabilities), cash flow (negative of the log costs per unit of sales), log labor productivity, log
labor productivity growth, size of the firm (the level of oﬃcial employment), and two-digit-
OKONH industry dummies. Firm-level controls are needed in order to analyze the eﬀect of
regional and industry characteristics in firms that, otherwise, would have similar prospects in
bankruptcy. Second, we control for gross regional product per capita. This is an important
31The index combined the data on political raiting of the governor during the last election and the share
of regional industrial output controlled by the governor’s team.
32This index was constructed using information on 1) the frequency of public statements by the governor
against the policies of the federal center, 2) the extent to which regional laws and regulations violate federal
laws, 3) the level of support of the governor by the president at the last regional elections, and 4) the presence
of a bilateral treaty between the region and the center.
33We take negatives of costs and cash tax collections in order to have all the predictions of the same sign
for each outcome.
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control because political characteristics of the regions that we are interested in may be cor-
related with regional economic development that in turn may aﬀect the numbers of regional
bankruptcy procedures. All control variables are measured in 1997, before the introduction
of the new law. Table 1A in appendix presents summary statistics for variables used in the
regression analysis. We specify clusters in εi so that observations are allowed to be correlated
within combinations of regions and 2-digit industries (Krishnaiah and Rao, 1994).
In accordance with the model, we expect to find positive eﬀects of regional political
strength, hostility, in-kind tax collections, and industry-level cash flows on the probability of
external management and negative eﬀects of these variables on the probability of liquidation
procedure.
Table 2 presents the regression results. They are as predicted by our model. Ceretis
paribus, political strength of the governor that proxies the ease with which governor can
influence courts positively aﬀects the probability of external management procedure against
the regional firms. The sign of coeﬃcient of the political strength for the liquidation out-
come is negative but insignificant.34 The probability of external management is significantly
higher and the probability of liquidation is significantly lower for firms in regions where the
governor is at odds with the federal center compared to similar firms in regions that have
friendly relations with the center. Regions with higher share of in kind tax collections, our
proxy for corruption and bribes, have significantly higher probability of external manage-
ment procedures and significantly lower probability of liquidation procedures in the regional
firms. In addition, firms in industries with larger cash flows (a proxy for the size of private
benefits) have higher chances of getting into an external management procedure and lower
chances to be liquidated.35 The economic significance of these results is as follows. One stan-
dard deviation increases in the measures of governor’s political strength, regional hostility
towards the federal center, in-kind tax collections, and of the industry cash flow increase the
probability that an average firm ends up in external management procedure by 23, 33, 26,
34In specifications with fewer controls (and, therefore, more observations) the coeﬃcient of political
strength for the liquidation outcome is negative and significant.
35These results are very robust: they do not depend on a particular specification or the choice of control
variables.
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and 42 percent of predicted probability of this outcome.36 One standard deviation increases
in the measures of regional hostility towards the federal center, in-kind tax collections, and
of the industry cash flow decrease the probability that an average firm ends up in liquidation
procedure by 18, 31, 19, and 29 percent of predicted probability of this outcome.37
Signs of the coeﬃcients of control variables are also as one would expect: low levels of cur-
rent liquidity and labor productivity significantly increase the probability of both bankruptcy
procedures. As predicted by political economy models in which politicians (and judges) care
about employment, we find that firms that end up in liquidation are significantly smaller
than average. The size of the firms that end up in external management procedure is, how-
ever, above the size of firms that are unaﬀected by bankruptcy. Since regional governments
are more likely to use external management procedure to protect large firms from the federal
government and outside creditors, this is consistent with our model of bankruptcy capture.
In the case of politically independent bankruptcy, regional political variables should have
no eﬀect on the probability of bankruptcy procedures unless these variables were correlated
with regional economic distress that is not properly accounted for by our control variables. In
this case, however, regional political variables should have the same eﬀect on the probability
of both bankruptcy procedures. In contrast, we find the opposite eﬀects of regional political
variables on the probability of external management and liquidation procedures holding firm
characteristics constant, just as our model predicts.38
How does external management influence ex post restructuring?
The model of bankruptcy capture implies no restructuring following the introduction of
external management. To test whether firms under the external management procedure
restructure as they are supposed to under the assumption of independent bankruptcy, we
36Predicted probability of the external management outcome evaluated at the mean value of employment
for firms with this outcome and overall means for all the other independent variables is equal to 1.78 percent.
37Predicted probability of the liquidation outcome evaluated at the mean value of employment for firms
with this outcome and overall means for all the other independent variables is equal to 0.03 percent.
38The indices of governor’s political strength and hostility towards the center do not seem to correlate with
regional economic distress. The correlation coeﬃcients of these variables with various available measures of
regional economic well-being (for instance, per capita growth, index of resource potential, ratio of per capita
income to subsistence level, etc.) are small, positive, and insignificant.
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compare several measures of restructuring in similar firms in two groups: group of firms
that started external management procedure in 1998 and a control group. We use the
following four proxies for restructuring: log sales growth, log labor productivity growth, log
employment cuts, and log number of new product varieties between 1998 and 1999. The
control group is comprised of two firms for each firm under external management. The
two firms are chosen from the same five-digit-OKONH industry as the firm under external
management so that they are the closest to it in size (one smaller; one larger). The number
of firms that started external management procedure in 1998 for which we have all required
data is 134. The resulting sample consists of 380 firms.
We run an OLS regression of the proxies for restructuring between 1998 and 1999 on
the external management dummy controlling for lagged labor productivity growth (between
1996 and 1997), outside finance during 1998 and 1999 (which we proxy by the log change
in the stock of the outside finance), initial employment size and two-digit-OKONH industry
dummies. Our model predicts no correlation of restructuring and external management
dummy. This is in contrast to the independent bankruptcy case that predicts above average
levels of restructuring in firms under external management procedure.
Table 3 presents the regression results. Coeﬃcients of external management dummy in
all regressions are insignificant. And they are negative in regressions of sales growth, labor
productivity growth, and employment cuts. The p-values of the tests that coeﬃcients at ex-
ternal management dummy are strictly positive (as predicted by the alternative hypothesis)
range from 73 to 60 percent. This evidence supports our story that there is no diﬀerence in
restructuring eﬀorts between firms in and outside the external management procedure. The
coeﬃcients are not very precisely estimated, however: as reported in table 3, the confidence
intervals for coeﬃcient estimates at external management dummy are quite wide: the diﬀer-
ence in sales growth between external management firms and similar firms not in bankruptcy
can be anywhere between -20 and 14 percent; the diﬀerence in labor productivity growth
ranges from -18 to 13 percent; in layoﬀs between -8 and 3 percent; and in the number of new
products between -13 and 7 percent.
Overall, the evidence acquired from both tests is consistent with our model of bankruptcy
capture and seems to be inconsistent with politically independent bankruptcy.
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5 Conclusion
This paper investigates the eﬀect of a legal transplant into the weak institutional environ-
ment. Russia’s bankruptcy law of 1998 was intended to solve several important problems of
corporate governance: release of assets from ineﬃcient uses, secure the rights of creditors,
and discipline the managers. Although the law was drafted with these goals in view, in real-
ity it did not induce restructuring or harden managerial budget constraints. Absence of the
rule of law transformed bankruptcy into the mechanism that allowed regional governors and
incumbent managers of large firms to leave outside claim holders unsatisfied. In particular,
the federal government (the largest outside claim holder) had no eﬀective legal mechanism
for collecting tax arrears. We argue that a possible reason for this is the capture of regional
divisions of arbitration courts and analyze the consequences of this capture.
A simple model shows that when the judiciary is captured, the manager has no incentives
to restructure and the debt to the outside investor is not repaid. Instead, the threat of
bankruptcy is used to perpetuate insolvency in a collusive deal between the manager and
the governor. An empirical investigation provides support to the theoretical findings. Just
as the model predicts, firms in industries with high cash flow and regions with politically
strong governors, governors independent from the federal center, and opaque tax collection
systems were more likely to have external management procedure initiated against them
after the enactment of the 1998 law compared to similar firms in other regions and industries.
Furthermore, introduction of an external management procedure did not change performance
of the firms or triggered layoﬀs as one would expect to see during reorganization.
Thus, the dependence of arbitration courts on regional governments had important impli-
cations for the Russian economy. First, assets were locked into ineﬃcient uses by unrestruc-
tured enterprises. Second, even very profitable projects could hardly be financed by outside
investors due to insecurity of property rights. Third, regional protection of firms against
federal tax authorities seriously undermined federal attempts to improve tax collection.
Our findings shed some light on a fundamental question: How do laws aﬀect agents’
behavior when enforcement is weak and the judiciary is dependent? Our analysis suggests
that it may be worthwhile to give up some sophisticated features of the law, including
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judges’ discretion to avoid ineﬃcient liquidation, in order to secure implementation of its
basic objectives.
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Table 1: Initiation of bankruptcy procedures
Year total
excluding proceeding against 
absent debtors
1993 <100 n/a
1994 240 n/a
1995 1,108 n/a
1996 2,618 n/a
1997 4,320 n/a
1998 8,337 4,893
1999 10,933 5,940
2000 19,041 7,959
2001 56,920 8,538
Source: Higher Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation
Proceedings initiated:
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Coefficient dy/dx Coefficient dy/dx
0.14 * 0.0010 * -0.11 0.0000
[0.07] [0.0005] [0.09] [0.0000]
0.25 *** 0.0018 *** -0.23 ** -0.0001 *
[0.09] [0.0007] [0.11] [0.0001]
0.91 *** 0.0063 *** -0.67 ** -0.0002 *
[0.29] [0.0023] [0.33] [0.0001]
6.02 *** 0.0415 *** -4.09 *** -0.0014 **
[1.40] [0.0115] [1.41] [0.0007]
Firm's leverage ratio, 97 0.09 0.0006 0.08 0.0000
[0.06] [0.0004] [0.06] [0.0000]
Firm's current liquidity, 97 [-1.97] *** -0.0136 *** -4.05 *** -0.0014 ***
[0.27] [0.0014] [0.42] [0.0004]
Firm's cash flow, 97 -0.24 -0.0016 -0.18 -0.0001
[0.20] [0.0014] [0.16] [0.0001]
Firm's log labor productivity, 97 -0.23 ** -0.0016 ** -0.39 *** -0.0001 **
[0.10] [0.0007] [0.10] [0.0001]
-0.01 -0.0001 -0.07 0.0000
[0.11] [0.0007] [0.10] [0.0000]
Firm's log enterprise employment, 97 0.72 *** 0.0050 *** -0.29 *** -0.0001 **
[0.06] [0.0008] [0.11] [0.0001]
Log gross regional product per capita, 97 0.12 0.0008 -0.01 0.0000
[0.21] [0.0015] [0.23] [0.0001]
2-digit industry dummies included YES *** YES ***
Frequency of the outcome 2.70% 2.29%
Predicted probability 0.695% 0.035%
Observations 8773
Pseudo R-squared 0.34
Note: Comparison group is no bankruptcy. Clusters for combination of 2-digit industry and region are 
allowed. Marginal effect are evaluated at the mean values of independent variables. Robust standard 
errors in brackets. *, **, and *** significant at 10, 5, and1%, respectively.
Table 2. Ex ante firm chracterictics: multinomial logit estimation
External management Liquidation
Probability of the following bankruptcy procedure against a firm in 1998-99 compared to no bankruptcy 
outcome:
Political strength of the governor, 97
Regional hostility towards the center, 97
In-kind regional tax collections, 97
5-digit industry median cash flow, 97
Firm's log labor productivity growth, 96-97
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Table 3: External management and restructuring
Sales growth,  
98-99
Labor 
productivity 
growth, 98-99
Employment 
cuts, 98-99
Number of new 
product 
varieties, 98-99
External management -0.029 -0.023 -0.023 -0.03
[0.105] [0.092] [0.038] [0.065]
Lag of labor productivity growth (96-97) -0.051 -0.114** 0.007 0.074*
[0.065] [0.057] [0.024] [0.042]
Outside finance, 98-99 0.175*** 0.117*** 0.024** -0.016
[0.029] [0.026] [0.010] [0.018]
Initial employment size, 96 -0.066 -0.064 0.836*** 0.174***
[0.048] [0.042] [0.017] [0.030]
2-digit industry dummies included YES*** YES*** YES*** YES***
Observations 366 366 366 380
% of fiirms under external management 34.7 34.7 34.7 35.2
R-squared 0.14 0.09 0.92 0.14
P-value of one-sided test that coefficient of 
external management is sitictly positive 0.610 0.597 0.728 0.677
Lower end of the 90% confidence interval -0.203 -0.175 -0.085 -0.136
Upper end of the 90% confidence interval 0.144 0.130 0.039 0.077
Note: Dependent variables are in logs. Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Note: The figure reports the discounted sum of future payoﬀs of the continuation game.
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Note: The figure reports the discounted sum of future payoﬀs of the continuation game.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1. In the subgame where e = C, and the investor has not filed for
bankruptcy, the stage game is repeated in the next period. In the new sequence, the manager
faces exactly the same incentives: if it was optimal to choose e = C at Step 0 is optimal
to do so at Step 1; so debts will not be repaid at the end of the next period. Anticipating
this the investor files for bankruptcy at Step 2, since L − τ > 0. Thus, choosing e = C
provides the manager with the life-time utility of V C(1 − δ) (as he loses control at Step
2). In the subgame where e = R, the investor obtains IR if he lets the manager complete
the restructuring and L− τ if he chooses to bankrupt the firm. Therefore, a manager with
V R ≥ V C(1− δ) chooses e = R at t= 0.¥
Proof of Proposition 2.The proof is similar to that of Proposition 1 except that when
L − γ > IR, the investor chooses to liquidate even in the subgame when e = R. Since
(1− δ)V C > 0, while he earns zero payoﬀ in the first period when he chooses to restructure,
the manager never initiates restructuring.¥
Proof of Proposition 3. The result follows immediately from Proposition 1 and the
assumption of a benevolent judge.¥
Proof of Proposition 4. In any subgame where e = R, the governor faces the choice
between awaiting debts repayment and the flow of taxes or liquidating which yields a payoﬀ
of L − γ. No bribes can be paid since the manager has no liquidity. Under condition (ii),
the governor prefers to liquidate and the manager loses control and his payoﬀ is zero. In the
subgame where e = C, the governor obtains his one time payoﬀ L − γ if he liquidates. If
he takes the bribe (and does not liquidate), the manager proceeds to the next period. The
manager chooses e = C if and only if V C −
P∞
t=0 δ
tb∗t ≥ 0 if selecting e = C yields a larger
payoﬀ than e = R. Using our assumption on negotiations, i.e. symmetric Nash bargaining
solution, we have
P∞
t=0 δ
tb∗t =
bN
1−δ with b
N = argmax
¡
δV C (1− δ)− b
¢
(b− (L− γ) (1− δ))
st. b ≥ (L− γ) (1− δ) (the governor’s rationality constraint) and b ≤ (1− δ)V C (the
manager’s liability constraint). Thus the liability constraints which applies in each period
guarantees the non-negativity of the payoﬀ associated with playing C in each period. The
assumption of non negative net gain from collusion guarantees that the repeated game payoﬀ
is strictly positive. Hence, any subgame perfect equilibrium entails e = C in each period, no
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bankruptcy and no liquidation and
P∞
t=0 δ
tb∗t =
bN
1−δ .
In the subgame where the manager chooses e = R, the governor always bankrupt the
firm. Initiating restructuring (e = R) means losing control and 0 payoﬀ to the manager.
Therefore, he refrains from e = R even when V C < V R.In the subgame where he chooses
e = C, the manager also pays the bribe. If he does not, the governor chooses to liquidate
which is optimal by ii) since the governor knows that the manager’s equilibrium strategy is
that if he does not pay a bribe now then he does not pay a bribe in any of the subsequent
periods.¥
Proof of Proposition 5. When GR large, the governor has interest in restructuring, so
he always lets the manager complete it. The manager chooses not to restructure when V R <
V C −
P∞
t=0 δ
tb∗t . By condition i) the governor prefers to pocket bribes than to liquidate.¥
Proof of Proposition 6. If γ < (1− δ)V C , the manager can cover the cost of protection
only out of his current private benefit. Since L− γ < 0, the governor never threatens with
liquidation. So the most the manager pays for protection if an outsider files a petition
(which can only happen once) is (1− δ)V C . Therefore, he chooses not to restructure when
V R < δV C .¥
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Table 1A. Summary statistics for variables used in regression analysis
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Ex-ante firm characteristics regression:
Outcome (0-no bankruptcy; 1-external management; 2-
liquidation) 8773 0.073 0.337 0 2
Political strength of the governor, 97 8773 3.795 1.710 1 5
Regional hostility towards the center, 97 8773 2.618 1.319 1 5
In-kind regional tax collections, 97 (Proxied by the 
negative of log % of cash tax collection) 8773 -0.667 0.286 -1.43 -0.06
5-digit industry median value of cash flow, 97 
(Proxied by negative of log cost per unit of sales) 8773 -4.577 0.070 -5.20 -4.35
Firm's leverage ratio, 97 8773 0.510 0.784 0.02 15.00
Firm's current liquidity, 97 8773 1.221 1.255 0.01 38.36
Firm's cash flow, 97 (Proxied by negative of log cost 
per unit of sales) 8773 -4.696 0.447 -10.84 -1.13
Firm's log labor productivity, 97 8773 3.729 1.308 -5.91 9.48
Firm's log labor productivity growth, 96-97 8773 0.056 0.651 -24.00 6.03
Firm's log enterprise employment, 97 8773 5.636 1.384 0.00 11.41
Log gross regional product per capita, 97 8773 9.471 0.432 8.39 11.09
Ex-post restructuring regressions:
Dummy for external management in 98 380 0.353 0.478 0 1
Log sales growth, 98-99 366 -0.048 0.984 -6.06 2.49
Log labor productivity growth, 98-99 366 0.032 0.869 -5.69 2.60
Log employment cuts, 98-99 366 4.678 1.146 -0.39 7.96
Log number of new product varieties, 98-99 380 0.521 0.617 0.00 2.77
Log labor productivity growth, 96-97 380 -0.049 0.754 -4.08 5.93
Log change in outside finance, 98-99 380 -1.467 1.996 -8.75 2.83
Log employment, 96 380 6.796 1.306 3.04 10.29
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